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Trade liberalisation with heterogeneous firms
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This paper examines the impact of trade liberalisation with heterogeneous firms using the Melitz 
(2003) model. We find a number of novel results and effects including a Stolper-Samuelson like 
result and several results related to the volume of trade, which are empirically testable. We also find 
what might be called an anti-variety effect as the result of trade liberalisation. This resonates with 
the often voiced criticism from antiglobalists that globalisation leads the world to become more 
homogenous by eliminating local specialities. Nevertheless, we find that trade liberalisation always 
leads to welfare gains in the model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Empirical work over the past decade shows that the standard new trade theory assumption of 
identical firms glosses over many important aspects of reality. For instance, not all firms even trade 
in traded goods sectors, and productivity is also typically higher among exporting than non-
exporting firms in a sector (Aw, Chung and Roberts 2000, Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999a,b, 2001; 
Clerides, Lach and Tybout 1998;  Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz 2004; see Tybout 2003 for a survey) 
This empirical evidence has lead to the development of trade models which are modified to allow 
for a more sophisticated view of firms. The microeconomic link between trade liberalisation and 
firm productivity is explicitly modelled in Eaton and Kortum (2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and 
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Kortum (2003), Melitz (2003), and Yeaple (2005).
1 Extensions are found in Baldwin and Okubo 
(2005), Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2005), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Schott (2003), Bernard, 
Redding, and Schott (2004), Falvey, Greenaway and Yu (2004), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 
(2004), Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), and Yeaple (2004). 
In this paper, we examine the various positive and normative aspects of trade liberalisation with 
heterogeneous firms using the Melitz (2003) model. The effect of lower trade costs as well as the 
effect of lower regulatory barriers to trade (beachhead costs) when countries are asymmetric in size 
are analysed. We find a number of novel results and effects including a Stolper-Samuelson like 
result and several results related to the volume of trade, which are empirically testable. Moreover 
we find what might be called an anti-variety effect, meaning that the consumed variety (the 
available range of product varieties) may fall in a country, as a result of trade liberalisation. 
Interestingly, the anti-variety effect resonates with the often voiced criticism from antiglobalists that 
globalisation leads the world to become more homogenous by eliminating local specialities. 
However, despite this anti-variety effect, we note that we find that trade liberalisation always leads 
to welfare gains in the model. 
Though distinctly different, our paper is related to Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), who analyse trade 
liberalisation in a modified Melitz (2003) model, where a linear demand system à la Ottaviano, 
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) is used. This specification allows them to study pro-competitive effects, 
which are absent in the standard model we use (as in all Dixit-Stiglitz based models). However, 
contrary to our paper, trade integration always produces an increased variety for consumers in their 
model specification. Another notable difference is that because Melitz and Ottaviano assume away 
the fixed beachhead costs in each market, they can not analyse regulatory liberalisation. 
The rest of the paper is organised in four sections. The next section presents the model. Section 3 
studies the positive effects of two types of trade liberalisation – the standard reduction in the 
marginal cost of trading goods and the reduction of fixed market-entry costs implied by so-called 
technical barriers to trade. The fourth section presents welfare results, and the final section 
concludes.  
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2. THE MODEL 
We work with the basic trade model with heterogeneous firms of Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 
(2003). There are two nations that are identical in all respects except that they potentially differ by 
size. Each nation uses a single primary factor of production (labour L) to produce goods in two 
sectors (the T-sector and the M-sector). The T-sector (traditional sector) is a Walrasian, 
homogenous-goods sector with costless trade. The M-sector (manufactures) is marked by increasing 
returns, Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and iceberg trade costs. M-sector firms face 
constant marginal production costs and three types of fixed costs. The first fixed cost, FI, is the 
standard Dixit-Stiglitz cost of developing a new variety (I is a mnemonic for innovation). The 
second and third fixed costs are what have been called ‘beachhead’ costs since they reflect the one-
time expense of introducing a new variety into a market (i.e. establishing a beachhead). 
Specifically, the cost of introducing a new variety to domestic and non-domestic markets is FD and 
FX, respectively (D for domestic and X for exports).  
Crucially, the model allows for heterogeneity with respect to firms’ marginal production costs. Each 
Dixit-Stiglitz firm/variety is associated with a particular labour input coefficient – denoted as aj for 
firm j. These a’s are generated during a product innovation process that costs FI units of labour. 
Specifically, just after paying FI entry cost, the firm is randomly assigned an ‘aj’ from the density 
function G[a], whose support is 0 ≤ a ≤ a0.
 Intuition may be served by thinking of the entry-cum-
lottery as a single innovation process. That is to say, the innovation technology is stochastic since 
sinking FI units of labour produces a ‘blueprint’ for a new variety with certainty, but the associated 
marginal cost is random.  
Our analysis exclusively focuses on steady state equilibria and intertemporal discounting is ignored; 
the present value of firms is kept finite by assuming that firms face a constant probability of ‘death’ 
according to a Poisson process with the hazard rate δ. 
Consumers in each nation have two-tier utility functions with the upper tier (Cobb-Douglas) 
determining the consumer’s division of expenditure among sectors and the second tier (CES) 
dictating the consumer’s preferences over the various differentiated varieties within the M-sector.  
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where E is expenditure, pT is the price of the homogenous traditional good, pi is the consumer price 
of variety i, and Θ is the set of all varieties consumed; σ is the constant elasticity of substitution 
among varieties and µ is the Cobb-Douglas spending share on manufactures.   
2.1.  Equilibrium 
As is well known, constant returns, perfect competition and zero trade costs in the T-sector equalise 
wages in the two nations. With a proper choice of units and numeraire, we have: 
(2)     1 * = = = w w pT . 
With nominal wages pinned down at unity, we can without ambiguity refer to a M-sector firm’s ‘a’ 
as its marginal costs. 
Although each firm has its own marginal cost, intuition is boosted by grouping firms into three 
types: firms that produce but only sell locally (D-types, short for domestic firms), firms that sell 
locally and also export (X-types, short for export firms), and firms that do not produce (N types, 
short for non-producers). Intuitively, firms whose FI investment yields a very high marginal cost 
would sell very little if they produce and so, they will not find it worthwhile to sink the FD; these 
become N-types. Firms that draw very low a’s (marginal costs) will sell a great deal if they produce 
and so, they find it worthwhile to sink the beachhead costs in domestic and export markets; these 
become X-types. Firms with intermediate a’s become D-types. We now turn to the formal cut-off 
conditions for the three types.  
2.1.1.  The Cut-off Conditions 
Given standard Dixit-Stiglitz results, the level of a firm’s sales in its local market is related to its 
marginal cost and the marginal costs of its competitors according to:
2 
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τ µ . 
Here ∆ (a mnemonic of the ‘denominator’ of the standard CES demand function) can be thought of 
as a weighted average of the marginal costs of all firms active in the market, n and n* are the 
masses of varieties produced in Home and Foreign, respectively, and τ is the iceberg trade cost; 
] [ D a a G is the conditional cumulative density function (only varieties with a’s less than aD are 
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produced so that we use the conditional cdf when considering the marginal cost of firm j relative to 
that of its competitors).  
As usual with Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, the operating profit earned in this market 
will be 1/σ times the value of sales.
3 Since the beachhead costs are sunk, firms consider the present 
value of operating profit and the beachhead costs. Given the constant firm-death rate δ and the zero 
discount rate, the present value of a given firm is just π/δ, where π is the operating profit the firm 
would earn if it actually produces. For a Home-based firm, the cut-off levels of the marginal cost in 
the local and export markets are, respectively, defined by:
4 
(4)   X X D D f B a f B a = =
− − * ;
1 1 σ σ φ , 
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aD and aX are the cut-off marginal costs for entering the local market and the export market, 
respectively, and we have grouped σ δ and the F’s for notational convenience; φ ranges from zero 
when trade is perfectly closed (τ=∞) to unity when trade is perfectly free (τ=1); we refer to φ as the 
‘free-ness’ of trade. The cut-off conditions for a Foreign-based firm are  d D f B a =
− * 1 * σ
, and 
X X f B a =
−σ 1 * . 
However, as shown by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003), B=B* in this model even if 
country size differs. The intuition for this is that free entry of firms will ensure that the expected 
operating profit (and therefore sales) must be the same in both markets in equilibrium, since fixed 
and variable costs are identical, trade costs are symmetric, and the distributions of a’s are identical. 
Using that B=B* implies, from (4), that  ,
*
D D a a = and 
*
X X a a = . 
One fact that has been firmly established is that only a fraction of all firms that produce in a 
nation actually export (see Tybout 2003 for a survey of such findings). In terms of our model, this 
means that aX<aD is a regularity condition. From (4), the necessary and sufficient condition for this 
is that: 
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We will take this as the base case.  
2.1.2.  The Free Entry Condition  
A potential entrant pays FI to develop a new variety with a randomly assigned ‘a’. After developing 
the new variety and observing the associated ‘a’, the potential entrant decides whether to enter the 
local market only, or the local and export markets, or neither. For Home and Foreign, the free entry 
condition is that the ex ante (i.e. before ‘a’ is known) expected value of developing a variety equals 
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The first and second integrals in (6) show the ex ante expected value of the operating profit 
net of beachhead costs arising from domestic sales and export sales (multiplied by σδ), 
respectively; FI, which all firms must pay, is the sunk innovation cost. The free entry condition is 
identical for the two countries because B=B*,  ,
*
D D a a = and 
*
X X a a = .  
An immediate implication from the free entry condition is that all active firms (D-types and X-
types) except firms with a’s exactly equal to aD earn pure profits throughout their entire life in the 
sense of their revenue exceeding their variable costs by more than what would be needed to 
amortize their sunk costs. The reason is that the ex ante expected value of pure losses on N-types is 
balanced by the ex ante expected value of pure profits on D-types and X-types. These pure profits 
are not a payment to reward the foregone consumption wrapped up in the sunk costs (we have zero 
discounting), rather they are rents – rents earned for being lucky.  
2.1.3.  Solving the model with the Pareto distribution 
All of the analysis up to this point has been conducted without resort to a functional form for G. 
Indeed some of the subsequent analysis can also be conducted in this manner, but the reasoning is 
clearer when we have explicit solutions, which requires an explicit G[a]. Following standard 
practice, we adopt the Pareto distribution: 
(7)     1 0 ) ( ] [ 0
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where k and a0 are the ‘shape’ and ‘scale’ parameters, respectively. We normalise a0 to unity 
without loss of generality (we are free to choose units of M-sector goods).  
Given  
(7) and the regularity condition β≡k/(σ-1)>1 (so that the integrals in ∆ converge)
5: 
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Here, Ω (a mnemonic for ‘openness’) summarises the impact of beachhead trade barriers and 
iceberg trade barriers. The variable Ω summarises the two types of trade barriers in the model, so it 
is worth pointing out four features of Ω that facilitate intuition and subsequent analysis: (1) Ω 
measures the combined protective effects of higher fixed and variable trade costs; (2) Ω=0 with 
infinite τ and/or infinite FX/FD, (3) Ω=1 with zero iceberg costs and FX=FD; (4) we can also express 
Ω as φ(FX/FDφ)
1-β which tells us that as long as the inequality in (5) holds, Ω is bound between zero 
and unity.  
Finally, with a zero discount rate, the foregone consumption necessary to create new varieties 
requires no compensation, so the only source of current income is labour and thus:
6 
(9)     L E = . 
Using this, (3), the two cut-off conditions (4), the free entry condition (6), and (8), we get explicit, 
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Unlike in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz trade model – not all varieties are consumed by all agents since 
some are only sold locally. The number of consumed varieties in Home and Foreign are:
8 
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where nC and nC
* are the number of varieties consumed in Home and Foreign, respectively, and ψ is 












, in each nation.  
2.1.4. Trade  volume  and  pattern 
One of the stark differences to the standard homogenous-firms trade model concerns the export 
pattern. In particular, only a fraction of firms export their goods. This model displays standard intra-
industry trade in differentiated varieties produced by X-types, but the varieties of D-types are non-
traded even though they would be classified as being in a ‘traded goods’ sector.  
The value of the exports of a typical X-type firm tends to infinity as ‘a’ approaches zero, and equals 
fX for a=aX. For X-firms with intermediate a’s, the value of exports is: a
1-σφµL/∆σ, but the export 
cut-off condition tells us φµL/∆σ=fX/aX
1-σ, thus: 
















µ σ , 
where v[a] is the per firm export. Integrating over all X-types (weighting by frequency) and using 
(10), we have V, which is defined as the total value of exports in terms of the numeraire, i.e. 
nv[a]dG[a⏐aD] integrated from 0 to aX.  
It is interesting to note that the standard approach to ‘horizontal’ intra-industry trade (IIT) and 
vertical IIT fails in this model.
9 Many studies use unit value indices to deduce product quality – 
with higher prices indicating higher quality; the underlying assumption is that the trade 
classifications are too broad and thus, group together goods that are fundamentally different. In this 
model, the goods are absolutely symmetric in terms of product characteristics but nevertheless, they 
have very different prices.  
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3. POSITIVE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISATION 
There are two natural definitions of trade liberalisation in this model, one concerns the variable cost 
of trade φ and the other concerns the differential beachhead cost for local and imported varieties 
FX/FD. As we shall see, the two types of trade barriers usually affect variables in an isomorphic 
manner, since they are combined into the aggregate measure of openness, Ω.  
3.1.  Lower marginal cost of trade; symmetric countries 
We begin by considering reducing marginal trade costs, i.e. freer trade in the sense of dφ>0, when 
nations are symmetric in size. 
Figure 1: Cut-off points 
 
Inspection of (10) confirms the finding of Melitz (2003) that lower marginal trade costs (i.e. dφ>0) 
lowers aD and raises aX in both nations. When trade is at zero freeness (i.e. infinite trade costs) 
aX=0, so that even a firm with zero marginal cost does not export. Greater openness lifts aX while 
lowering aD.  Following Melitz (2003), we have FX/(φFD)>1 as our base case. However, for this to 
hold for all φ∈[0,1], it must be that FX > FD.  
Figure 1 shows two cases. When FX<FD, the cut-off points cross at some level of openness 














Case: FX>FDBaldwin & Forslid: Trade liberalisation with heterogeneous firms  10
markets, while the most inefficient firms only sell to the export market. This prediction does not 
agree with the facts and therefore, we take FX>FD as the focal case.
 10 
3.1.1.  Anti-variety production and consumption effect 
Turning to ‘n’ (the mass of produced varieties in a typical nation), an inspection of (10) with L=L* 
shows that freer trade reduces n in each nation. The proportional change is: 





− = n  
where we have used the standard ‘hat’ notation for proportional changes (e.g. x ˆ  equals dx/x), and 
Ω/(1+Ω) is the import share (i.e. the expenditure share on all imported varieties in a typical 
market).
11 Since the import share rises with openness, this expression tells us that the proportional 
















                                                 
10 One could imagine a modification of the standard model where FX is an additional cost on top of FD. In particular, an 
addition decision making stage for potential firms could be added. After sinking FI, they would have to decide whether 
to sink the cost of a factory, say FF, and then they would decide whether to sink FD and FX. The domestic cut-off 
condition would be aD
1-σB=FF+FD, while the export cut off would be φaD
1-σB=FX. Naturally, the standard equations – 
cut-offs and free entry – would only be valid for levels of openness where aX<aD; for the level of openness in the 
neighbourhood of free trade, a different set of equations would apply. However, in this article, we are considering the 
standard model. 
11 The market share of imported variety j is φaj
1-σ/∆, so integrating over all foreign varieties aj∈[0..aX], the import share 
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Figure 2: Varieties produced and consumed 
 
One of the great novelties of the monopolistic competition trade model was the fact the ‘varieties 
effect’ i.e. the fact that an autarky-to-free-trade liberalisation could raise the number of varieties 
available to consumers. In this model, that need not be the case.
12 The potential ambiguity stems 
from the fact that greater openness raises aX and thus, raises the fraction of Foreign-made varieties 
that are imported to Home while, at the same time, there is a drop in locally produced varieties. It is 
simple to characterise the ambiguity. Continuing to assume that L=L* and using (11) gives 


















which shows that the number of varieties bought by a typical consumer falls monotonically as the 
freeness of trade rises – as long as T≡FX/FD>1. Thus, a lower variable cost of trade will produce an 
‘anti-variety’ effect, i.e. the range of consumed varieties falls as trade becomes freer. If T≡FX/FD<1, 
then freer trade results in the more standard pro-variety effect. The two cases, and the knife-edge 
T=1 case, are shown in Figure 2. 
The basic intuition for these results flows most easily by first examining the knife-edge case of no 
fixed-cost protection, T=1, where an inspection of  (14) shows that nC is constant with respect to φ. 
                                                 
12 Melitz (2003) did note that the impact on the range of varieties available for a typical consumer could be ambiguous, 
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When T=1, there is no intrinsic difference between local and imported varieties, so that changes 
such as trade liberalisation which introduce more imported varieties will produce a one-for-one 
reduction in local varieties. More generally, when the ratio of beachhead costs FX/FD exceeds unity, 
nC falls as φ rises because imported varieties have systematically lower prices than the domestic 
varieties they displace. Restoring zero profits thus requires more than one D-type variety to be 
displaced by each additional X-type variety that is imported. Conversely, if beachhead costs are 
lower for imported varieties, the relationship is reversed and freer trade means a wider range of 
varieties available to consumers.
13  
 
3.2.  Lower marginal cost of trade; asymmetric countries  
The symmetric country case is useful for fixing ideas, but assumes away a range of interesting 
interactions between country size and trade liberalisation. In particular, once asymmetric country 
sizes are allowed, the model is marked by a modified version of the well-known ‘Home Market 
Effect’ (HME)
14.  
3.2.1.  Home Market Effect, HME Magnification and Delocation effects 
A convenient way of expressing the HME is that a nation’s share of industrial firms grows more 
than proportionally as its share of world expenditure on industrial goods grows. Note that from (10), 
Home’s share of the worldwide mass of M-sector firms and the total mass of firms worldwide are: 
(15) 
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Using sE to denote Home’s share of world expenditure and sn to denote its share of the world’s M-
sector firms, log differentiation of n in (10) implies: 














An inspection of this shows that the HME does hold since the coefficient on 
E s ˆ  is greater than 
unity. We can also see that the HME is subject to the usual HME magnification effect (the shift in 
firms to Home as Home’s expenditure share rises becomes stronger as trade becomes freer).  
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Another feature of the monopolistic competition trade model is the so-called delocation effect, 
namely the tendency of freer trade to ‘shift’ more industry to the large region. Log differentiation of 
Home’s share of world M-sector firms with respect to ‘openness’ Ω yields: 
(17)     Ω
Ω − −
Ω − Ω −
= ˆ
) 1 (







An inspection of this shows that if Home is larger (i.e. L>L* so sE>½), then freer trade will increase 
Home’s share of M-sector firms. Moreover, there is also a magnification effect since the strength of 
the shift in M-sector production to the larger market becomes stronger as trade becomes freer. From 
(15), it can be seen that the so-called sustain point when the entire M-sector is located at home is 
reached when  L L
S ∗ = Ω = Ω .   
Non-monotonic production shifting effects 
The actual mass of firms in Home varies very non-monotonically with openness since the HME 
magnification, which tends to raise n, interacts with the overall drop in n
W. The derivative of n with 
respect to openness Ω is: 




) 1 ( * 2
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β µ . 
The sign of this is ambiguous, e.g. when Ω=0, the derivative is unambiguously negative, but when 
Ω=Ω
S, the derivative is unambiguously positive. Naturally, the impact on the mass of firms in the 
small region is unambiguously negative since the delocation effect and the drop in nw work in the 
same direction. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where it may be noted that n=n
w beyond Ω
s. 
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Figure 3: Non-monotonic shifts in n and n* 
 
3.2.2.  Anti-variety effects; asymmetric nations 
The fact that production is marked by non-monotonic relationships suggests that the number of 
consumed varieties will also be marked by non-monotonicities.  To study this, it proves useful to re-
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By inspection, we see that the first term of nC tends to increase with openness Ω when T>1, but the 
second term tends to decrease with Ω; the magnitude of both effects depends upon T and Ω, as well 
as on the relative size of the nations. Differentiation of nC with respective to Ω gives: 
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Evaluating this derivative in the base case with T>1 at no-trade, i.e. Ω=0, and at the sustain point, 
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Thus, openness is anti-variety for the large nation when trade barriers are initially high, but 
openness is pro-variety when trade is close to the sustain point level of openness (i.e. when almost 
all M-sector production is in the large region). Naturally, when trade is more open than Ω
s, further 
opening is anti-variety since all varieties are in the Home nation and we know that openness 
unambiguously monotonically reduces the worldwide number of varieties.  
For the small nation, the derivative of nC* with respect to openness is identical to that of the large 
nation but with L and L* swapped. It is easily shown that d(nC*)/dΩ is negative for all permissible 
values of Ω, given that T>1.
15 The consumption variety effect, shown in Figure 4 (when 
S Ω < = Ω ) 1 (φ ), thus resembles the production variety effect shown in Figure 3. 
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Trade integration implies fewer domestically produced varieties and, for a small country, also a 
significant drop in total consumed variety. Nevertheless, as shown below, welfare always increases 
with trade freeness, irrespective of country size. However, if some individuals have a very high 
valuation of variety, or if one supposed there to be some intrinsic cultural or nationalist value in the 
availability of traditional varieties, this unambiguous impact on individual welfare might be 
mitigated or reversed in a social welfare evaluation. Indeed, many nations spend taxpayers’ money 
on keeping old ways and goods alive.  
3.2.3.  Trade Volume and Pattern 
From (12) we have that 
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As inspection of this expression shows that, for large countries, M-sector export increases with the 
level of trade freeness, φ. However, for sufficiently small countries, the inverse is true. This is due 
to the fact that even though, from (8), aX and therefore the share of exporting firms increase, the 
mass of firms decline in the small country.   
There are a couple of more subtle points related to the trade volume that suggest empirically 
testable hypotheses. First, the exports of each existing X-type firm expand in proportion. From (12), 

















Second, every new exporter should be smaller (in the sense of the value of domestic sales) than 
every existing exporter, since the drop in aX affects firms with a’s that were just below the cut-off 
before the liberalisation.  
The model also makes a number of predictions concerning ‘zeros’ in the trade matrix. Empirically 
oriented trade economists have long know there to be many zero bilateral trade flows in the world.
16 
The facts have been more recently documented in a systematic fashion by Feenstra and Rose (1997) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
15 See guide to calculations. 
16 For example, the old gravity equation literature pondered on the best solution to this with some authors dropping 
these observations, others performing Tobit regressions and others plugging in small positive values. See, e.g. Wang 
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and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004). Stepping slightly outside our two-nation model, one 
simple empirically testable implication of the model concerns the pattern of zeros.  
First, as has already been indirectly pointed out by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004), the 
pattern of zeros in bilateral aggregate trade flows should follow a geographical pattern, assuming 
that trade costs increase with distance. This is easily testable and indeed this is confirmed by the 
first stage of the Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein results. One could also test for zeros at the very finely 
defined commodity level using the time dimension of the data. For example, taking the US’s very 
finely disaggregated export data, the likelihood of a zero (controlling for the usual gravity equation 
issues like economic size of the importing nation) increasing with distance should be found. 
Likewise, as a result of any well defined liberalisation exercise, such as the phase in of Uruguay 
Round tariff cuts, it should be found that the impact of distance on the zeros diminishes as tariffs 
are cut.  
Second, some forms of trade liberalisations are more likely to reduce beachhead costs than variable 
trade costs. One common source of beachhead costs is known as technical barriers to trade (TBTs), 
many of which involve health, safety and environment certification of new products (see Baldwin 
2000 for details). One way in which such measures are reduced is via international agreements – 
e.g. Mutual Recognition Agreements either on testing (US-EU MRA) or product norms (New 
Approach Directives in the EU). These agreements should diminish the probability of observing a 
zero in any given bilateral trade flow that is affected. A simple difference-in-difference approach 
should pick this up on aggregate or disaggregate data. Notice that a reciprocal MRA predicts that 
the effects should be two-way in the affected sectors.  
Third, and more to the heart of the model logic, one should find a pattern in firm-level zeros in the 
data. Specifically, there should be a positive correlation between a firm’s domestic market share 
(which varies with its marginal cost) and the number of markets to which it exports, or the 
likelihood that it has a zero in any given market, controlling for standard market-specific factors. If 
one expands the model to allow for the standard proximity-versus-scale FDI à la Helpman-Melitz-
Yeaple, the prediction is still true but it is for the number of markets in which the firm sells (via 
location production is it is going for proximity; by exporting it is going for scale economies).  
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3.3.  Lower beachhead costs 
The classical notion of liberalisation is a reduction of marginal trading costs, however many of the 
trade barriers remaining among industrialised nations that are related to standards and regulations 
that make it difficult to introduce foreign-produced varieties into a market. These barriers, called 
technical barriers to trade in industrial goods and sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures in food 
trade, are some of the few remaining barriers to trade in manufactures among the US, Canada, the 
EU and Japan. Moreover, since classic trade barriers were eliminated in Western Europe by the 
mid-1970s, the last four decades of trade liberalisation in Western European nations have been 
mainly concerned with TBTs. This suggests that it is important to analyse the positive and 
normative implications of reducing the gap between the beachhead cost facing local and imported 
varieties. In particular, in this section, we assume these regulatory barriers to be reflected in the 
beachhead costs and that this explains why FX>FD, so the liberalisation involves a moving T=FX/FD 
towards unity. Naturally, it is not possible to change T without changing FD and/or FX, so we must 
be explicit about how T falls. To be concrete, consider a ceteris paribus reduction in FX as a fixed-
cost trade liberalisation, while a reduction of FD and FX in tandem (such that T is unaffected) is a 
domestic de-regulation.   
As an aside, we note that the formulation of the model makes FD and FX entirely distinct. That is, we 
cannot think of FD being part of the cost of, say, establishing a product’s safety in the home market, 
and FX as the extra (lower) cost of using the basic domestic results to establish the product’s safety 
in the foreign market. If this were the case, the export and local market entry conditions would be 
linked in the sense that the cost of entering the foreign market would be higher for firms that had 
not entered the domestic market.  
From (10), and (12), it can be seen that fixed cost trade liberalisation has qualitatively identical 
effects as dφ>1 when it comes n, aD, aX and the volume of trade. The impact on the number of 
varieties consumed differs and is, in principle, ambiguous. However, differentiating nC from (19) 
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which indicates that at least for very low TBTs, further liberalisation will increase nC in both small 
and large countries.   
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4. WELFARE EFFECTS OF LIBERALISATION 
Next, we turn to the welfare effects of liberalisation in this model, focusing on the aggregate and re-
distributive impact of greater openness. 
4.1.1.  Aggregate Gains from Trade 
As noted above, the utility of a typical agent in this model can be described by the indirect utility 
function E/P, where from (1), P=pT
1-µ ∆
µ/(1-σ), and P*= pT
1-µ (∆*)
µ/(1-σ), and where the ∆’s are defined 
in (3). Plugging in the equilibrium values for pT, n and n* and using the distribution for G in  































a P . 
Since we showed that aD always falls as trade becomes more open (in a variable or fixed trade cost 
sense) we see that both nations gain from integration regardless of size differences. Moreover, an 
inspection of (10) shows that greater openness raises aD at an accelerating rate, as Ω approaches 
unity (i.e. free trade).  
 
4.1.2. Stopler-Samuelson-like  result 
Income distribution effects can also be easily worked out. Indeed, this model displays classical 
Stolper-Samuelson-like behaviour.
17 There is only one primary factor in this model; however we 
can think of firm owners as owning ‘knowledge capital’. In particular, we can consider there to be 
three types of capital in this model: D-type capital, X-type capital and N-type capital, where the 
reward to D-type and X-type capital is the operating profit on D-type and X-type firms, 
respectively. Recall that although the average reward to the three types of capital must be zero (zero 
profit condition), this average consists of pure losses for some balanced by pure profits for others; 
D-type and X-type firm owners earn pure profits while drawers of ‘losing’ varieties earn the flow 
equivalent of minus FI.  
                                                 
17 Our earlier draft Baldwin and Forslid (2004) derived the impact on nominal rewards to labour and the three types of 
capital, while here we derive the real rewards, which is closer to the spirit of the original Stolper-Samuelson theorem; 
this requires an additional assumption on σ. Baldwin & Forslid: Trade liberalisation with heterogeneous firms  20
Of course the owner of a unit of X-type knowledge capital does not hold this forever, since her 
capital will eventually depreciate. But if the depreciation rate is chosen to give reasonable churning 
rates, each of the owners of D-type and X-type knowledge capital will care about openness for a 
very long time. As we shall see, under certain conditions, X-type capital owners win from 
reciprocal liberalisation while D-type firms lose from it. Thus, X-type capital owners – the large, 
efficient exporting firms – will support reciprocal trade liberalisation, while it will be opposed by 
D-type capital owners. Assuming that the durability of capital is high compared to the electoral 
cycle, such effects could be important in determining firm-level political support for multilateral 
trade negotiations.  
The reward to capital is a firm’s Ricardian surplus; its sales times the Dixit-Stiglitz operating profit 
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where we define rD and rX as the Ricardian surplus of typical D and X type firms.  
Turning to the impact of openness on nominal factor rewards, the easiest is labour. Labour is the 
numeraire, so that freer trade has no impact on the wage in terms of the numeraire good. The impact 
on the rental rates on D-type and X-type capital is also as simple to derive. As noted above, a firm’s 
total operating profit is proportional to its sales. Using (10) and (25), we get:  
(26)  . 0 ˆ , 0

















Next, turning to real factor rewards, it is easily shown that if the elasticity of substitution among 
varieties is sufficiently high (specifically, σ>1+µ), we get a Stolper-Samuelson chain:
18 
(27)   P r P w P r X D ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 ˆ ˆ − < − < < − . 
Note that this holds for countries irrespectively of size, since 
∧ ∧
= * P P  from (24), and that even if σ 
violates the condition σ>1+µ, we still have that the real gain to X-types exceeds that of D-types.  
An interesting implication of (27) when combined with the fact that rental rates are inversely 
proportional to a’s is that the income distribution among active-firm owners follows a fractals-like 
pattern. That is, capital rental rates will follow a Pareto distribution with the shape parameter ρ+1-Baldwin & Forslid: Trade liberalisation with heterogeneous firms  21
σ. Thus if, for example, y% of the gains from liberalisation accrue to the top x% of the income 
distribution, the same is true for the top x% of the top x%. This fractal-like income distribution has 
received some empirical support from income distribution studies.  
It is important to recall that each D-type and each X-type earns pure profits throughout its life time, 
so that these Stolper-Samuelson results are not transitory. They are permanent, firm by firm. 
Naturally, new firms that become active will not experience an increase in their Ricardian surplus, 
but they will earn a reward that is higher than it would have been without the liberalisation.   
The Stolper-Samuelson-like result in (26) should be testable via stock market data for large and 
small firms. The impact of a clearly defined liberalisation ‘treatment’ should be asymmetric for 
large and small firms. Simply put, the rise in a firm’s stock market price in reaction to a reciprocal 
trade liberalisation should be positive for firms that are sufficiently large and negative for firms that 
are sufficiently small.  
4.1.3.  Fixed cost liberalisation 
An inspection of (25) and (10) shows that the income distribution impact of fixed cost trade barrier 
liberalisation will be quite different compared to variable trade cost liberalisation, at least for X-
type firms. In particular, reducing FX reduces aD and this, as per (25), reduces the reward to both X-
type and D-type capital. In other words, greater regulatory liberalisation reduces both operating 
profits by the same proportion, but does not affect the wage. The intuition for this result is clear. 
The beachhead costs create barriers to enter that must, in equilibrium, be compensated by higher 
operating profits. Reducing the beachhead costs thus reduces the flow reward to active firms. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Trade models with heterogeneous firms and beachhead costs constitute an important new 
instrument in the toolbox of international trade theorists. Of course, nothing under the sun is 
entirely new – many, many trade theorists have published models where firms have different 
marginal costs, and the late 1980s saw a flourishing of papers and books on models with beachhead 
costs. Nevertheless, the assumption of continuous marginal-cost heterogeneity in a monopolistic 
competition setting teamed with beachhead costs constitutes more than just an incremental 
improvement on existing models, since it allows us to consider a broad range of real-world facts – 
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those concerning firm-size and trade issues – that the standard monopolistic competition trade 
models had to assume away.  
This paper works out the impact of great openness, in terms of variable and fixed trade costs, and 
develops a sequence of testable hypotheses. The paper also studies the impact of greater openness at 
both the firmlevel and the aggregate level, focusing on changes in the numbers and types of firms, 
trade volumes and trade prices. Contrary to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz trade model, global variety 
falls as the result of trade liberalisation, and it may be that consumed variety falls in a country. The 
normative effects of liberalisation are also studied and here, the paper focuses on aggregate gains 
from trade, and income redistribution effects, showing inter alia that the model is marked by a 
Stolper-Samuelson-like effect.  
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GUIDE TO CALCULATIONS FOR REFEREES AND READERS 
Calculations refered to in 2.  
The standard CES demand function is:  
  c j=µE(pj)
-σ/( di p
- 1
i i ∫ Θ ∈
σ )  
multiplying both sides by pj, we get: 
  p jcj=µE(pj)
1-σ/( di p
- 1
i i ∫ Θ ∈
σ )  
for variety j, where the integral is over all competing varieties (i.e. i∈Θ), and µE is total expenditure 
on all varieties in the market, since µ is the Cobb-Douglas share of expenditure on M-goods. Given 
the well-known Dixit-Stiglitz feature called mill price, the price-marginal cost mark-ups are all 
identical and thus cancel out, so  
   pjcj=µE(pj)
1-σ / ({  ∫ ∫








1 ] [ * ] [
σ σ σ τ  },  
since  ] [ D a a ndG  gives the mass of varieties with marginal cost ‘a’. That is,  ] [ D a a G  is the 
condition density of a, given that the variety is actually produced, and there is a mass of ‘n’ on each 
‘a’; for a proof that this is the conditional density in equilibrium, see Melitz (2003).  
Note that we have here included all D-type varieties produced in the local market in the first 
integral and all varieties that are imported from the other market (i.e. varieties with a’s between zero 
and aX) in the second integral. Here, φ≡τ
1-σ  measures the iceberg trade costs that are passed on by 
foreign firms. Multiplying by aj yields the expression in the text. 
Calculations referred to in footnote 3:  
A typical Dixit-Stiglitz first-order condition is p(1-1/σ)=wa, where w is wage and p is price; 
rearranging, the operating profit, (p-wa)c, equals pc/σ with c defined as consumption. Thus, 
operating profit, (p-wa)c, is proportional to revenue, pc; the factor of proportionality is 1/σ. 
 
Calculations referred to in footnote 4:  
Defining π[a] as the steady-state operating profit earned by a firm with marginal cost ‘a’, the 
present value with a discount rate ρ and the Poisson firm-death process assumed is: π[a] Baldwin & Forslid: Trade liberalisation with heterogeneous firms  26
∫
∞
0 dt e e
t - t - δ ρ since the probability of the firm still being alive at t is e
-δt. Setting ρ=0 and solving the 
integral yields the expression in the text. 
 
Calculations referred to in footnote 5:  
The expression for ∆ follows directly from (4) and  








Calculations referred to in footnote 7. 
To find n, plug ∆ from (8) into the D-type cut-off condition. To find aD, plug the closed form 
solution for n into the free entry condition using the ratio of cut-off conditions to evaluate 
G[aX]/G[aD]. aX then follows from this the expression for aD and the ratio of the cut-off conditions. 
Using the solution for ∆ (and the corresponding expression for ∆*) in the domestic cut-off condition 
for the Home nation, we see that the aD drops out to leave: 







/ ) 1 ( β β µ
. 
Doing the same for the Home export cut-off condition, we get a similar expression where the aD 
does not drop out, but the expression involves the ratio of aD and aX: 
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β β µ σ /
*












− − . 
We eliminate the ratio of aD and aX by using the ratio of the cut-off conditions, and simplify to 
obtain: 







/ ) 1 ( * β β µ
. 
Solving these two expressions for n and n* yields the result in the text. 
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Calculations referred to in footnote 15. 
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dnC υ  and naturally, the entire action is in the numerator, which 
















− . Since Ω is bound by zero and unity, and L/L*>1, 
the term in the large parentheses is always negative. This proves the assertion in the text. 
 
Calculations referred to in footnote 18. 
Noting that a firm’s Ricardian surplus is 1/σ times its sales, the proportional change in the r’s is 
identical to the proportional changes in sales. Thus, we know that  X D r w r ˆ ˆ 0 ˆ < = < . To establish real 
factor reward changes, we must compare these to the proportional change in P shown in (24). The 
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+ − − = − D X a P r  and  D a P w ˆ 0 ˆ ˆ − = − . 
Since  D a ˆ is negative when trade freeness rises (dφ>0), we know that workers always gain, and 
σ>1+µ is a necessary and sufficient condition for D-type firm owners to lose. The X-type firm gains 

























P rX . Since  Ω > φ  for T>1, we have that  0 ˆ ˆ > − P rX .  